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Since the early 1950's, the rate of economic growth in Japan and in
a number of Western European countries has been significantly
higher than that in the United States. For example, during the dec-
ade from 1950 to 1960, the average rate of growth in real gross na-
tional product was 9.5 per cent in Japan, 7.7 per cent in West Ger-
many, 6.0 per cent in Italy, 4.4 per cent in the Netherlands, and 4.2
per cent in France, compared with 3.3 per cent in the United States.
It is, of course, generally recognized that economic growth in
democratic, largely free-enterprise societies can stem from a number
of sources and that the importance of any single source—whether it
be a larger labor force, more capital, more education, or a general
advance in technology—may vary considerably from country to
country. There has developed in this country a widespread belief
that much of the current disparity in growth rates is attributable to
differences in tax systems; that is, that the tax systems of these for-
eign countries are in many important respects less burdensome on
growth-generating activities than the tax system of the United
States, and that these countries have been able to accelerate their
growth by adopting special tax measures, most of which were de-
signed to encourage personal or corporate saving as well as capital-
widening or capital-deepening investments.
This conference was concerned with the postwar tax policies of
the five foreign countries mentioned above and of two other Euro-
pean countries—Sweden and Great Britain—whose growth rates
were lower than that of the United States during the 1950's, but
whose tax systems also contained special provisions which might be
expected to have growth-generating effects. Particular attention was
focused on such questions as the extent to which specific tax meas-
ures had infact contributed to economic growth, and what2 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
significant generalizations might be made from the experience of
these countries.
This summary outlines the major points in the principal papers
that were prepared for the conference and presents the highlights of
the discussion which took place at the conference sessions.
JAPAN
Ryutaro Komiya attributes Japan's high rate of growth during the
1950's to the large proportion of its gross domestic product allocat-
ed to capital formation. to its rapid improvement in technology,
and to its rapid absorption of disguised unemployment through
shifts in its labor force from low-productivity sectors of the econo-
my (such as agriculture, retail trade, and small business manufac-
turing) to high-productivity sectors. Postwar Japan was also favored
by a very low incremental capital-output ratio which, Komiya
points out, has meant that the productive efficiency of investment is
very high.
Among the factors which have contributed to Japan's high level
of capital formation, Komiya mentions: (1) the need to reconstruct
facilities damaged or destroyed during the war; (2) the opportunity
to exploit technological innovations which were developed in the
United States and other countries during and after the war; (3) do-
mestic land and labor reforms which brought about a more equal
distribution of income and hence an expanded market for consumer
goods; and (4) changes in the industrial structure which stimulated
the growth of enterprising new firms and made most sectors of the
economy more competitive. These factors, together with a steadily
rising consumer demand fostered by rapidly rising incomes and
large annual tax reductions, were the main driving forces behind
the steadily rising level of capital formation in Japan during the
late 1950's; but the fact that the level of government expenditures
and taxes has been kept low is also regarded by Komiya as a con-
tributing factor. Low levels of defense and social security expendi-
tures and of interest on the public debt have made it possible to
keep the level of government revenue low. Yet, in spite of this,Introduction and Summary 3
Japan's ratios of government net saving and of government fixed
investment to gross domestic product have been very high, and
these high levels of saving and investment have made a direct con-
tribution to capital formation.
Komiya recognizes the importance of the availability of funds as
a determinant of the level of private capital formation. He points
out that both personal and corporate saving have been extremely
high in Japan since the early 1950's, and that, in addition, corpora-
tions depend on bank loans as a source of fixed investment funds
more heavily in Japan than in other countries. He attributes the
high level of personal saving during this period to the high rate of
growth in real per capita income, and to certain institutional fac-
tors such as the high and increasing proportion of "bonus" income
in the total income of wage and salary earners. But another con-
tributing factor has, in his opinion, been the declining ratio of di-
rect to indirect taxes, which has meant a decline in the progressivity
of the Japanese tax system as a whole. The high propensity to save
of Japanese corporations is attributed in part to their greater need
to accumulate internal funds and in part to the fact that manage-
ment has relatively more freedom in the disposition of profits than
in other countries. In the course of the discussion, it was brought
Out that the availability of bank credit during this period depended
on the credit policies of the Bank of Japan, and that, in general,
their policy was to lend freely until this gave rise to a balance-of-
payments problem.
Komiya examines a number of the special tax provisions that were
introduced to promote personal saving, such as (1) the exemption
from personal income tax of interest from small deposits, (2) the ex-
emption of capital gains on securities, (3) a limited deduction of
life insurance premiums, and (4) the exclusion of a certain percent-
age of dividend income from personal income. Komiya is unable to
measure econometrically the effects which these provisions have had
on the disposition to save. If they have increased personal saving,
he fears that this has been the case only because of their adverse re-
distributive effects. He concludes that it would have been better to
increase government saving by increasing taxes, rather than to try
to increase personal saving by special measures such as these.4 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
Komiya's examination of the highly selective special tax provi-
sions that were designed to promote corporate saving in specific in-
dustries and investment in particular types of machinery and equip-
ment leaves him in some doubt about their over-all effectiveness.
For example, although many special provisions for accelerated
depreciation of assets have been introduced since 1951 for the
"modernization of industrial facilities" or the "advancement of new
technologies," most of them are said to be very selective in their ap-
plication. Frequently, the particular industry or type of machinery
and equipment eligible for a particular rate is left to the discretion
of the Minister of Finance. Komiya points out that the selective na-
ture of this system entails such complicated administrative proce-
dures that only large firms can cope with them and the result is that
accelerated depreciation has not necessarily raised the aggregate
level of capital formation in Japan. In view of the strong invest-
ment demand and an excess demand for investment funds, the loss
of accelerated depreciation allowances would have meant only more
bank loans to industry, and more Bank of Japan advances to the
commercial banks, as long as this did not create balance-of-payment
difficulties.
Other special tax provisions of this type examined by Komiya in-
clude the tax exemptions granted on income from "important new
products" and from exports, and the provisions permitting corpora-
tions to set up tax-free reserves for a variety of specified purposes.
While he concedes that these provisions, like those on accelerated
depreciation, may have had significant differential impacts, he
doubts whether they have been very effective in increasing aggre-
gate saving or investment. He also suggests that the discriminatory
character of many of these provisions may have resulted in some
misdirection of resources within the Japanese economy.
Komiya's conclusions' on the effectiveness of Japan's postwar tax
policies in promoting capital formation and economic growth are
that, while some of the desired effects have been achieved, these
have often been gained at the expense of tax equity. Unfortunately,
thereislittleempirical knowledge of the contribution which
specific growth-promoting policies have made; but it is Komiya's
opinion that much of what has been accomplished could have been
achieved more equitably in otherIntroduction and Summary 5
In their comments on Komiya's paper, both Sumio Hara and
Makoto Yasui express their general agreement with the analysis and
with most of the conclusions. In their assessment of the effectiveness
of the special tax provisions, however, both commentators are more
positive in their views that Japanese tax policies had made impor-
tant contributions to that country's growth rate. While admitting
that some errors of designation may have been committed by the
government, both strongly believe that accelerated depreciation has
contributed to the modernization of Japanese industry.
In the general discussion of Komiya's paper, considerable atten-
tion was given to the question whether accelerated depreciation, by
limiting the possibility of reducing taxes on consumption, did in-
crease aggregate investment or whether, by limiting the possibility
of further credit expansion, it merely redistributed what in effect
was a given amount of funds available for investment.
WEST GERMANY
Karl Häuser's study discusses first of all the role which tax policies
played in Germany's "miraculous" recovery from its state of eco-
nomic collapse in 1945 through the first half of 1948. In the follow-
ing period, from 1948 to 1962, there was no lack of over-all demand,
and consequently the rate of economic growth during these years
was primarily determined by the rate at which the supply of labor
and capital could be increased, or its quality improved. It is, there-
fore, to the effects of taxation on work, investment, saving incen-
tives, and the modernization and rationalization of production that
Häuser directs his attention.
Between the end of the war and the currency reform of 1948, the
German people were subject to very heavy tax burdens. Income and
excise tax rates were particularly high, and there was also a turn-
over tax, a tax on net wealth, and a tax on local enterprises. Since
1948, rates have been continuously reduced, although Häuser con-
tends that the over-all burden has remained considerably higher
than that of other countries. Excluding the social security levies, he
estimates that taxes take 23.4 per cent of GNP. In examining the
way in which tax reduction measures have contributed to economic6 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
growth, Häuser finds it convenient to consider separately (1). the pe-
riod of rapid recovery, 1948-51, (2) the period of "normalization"
and consolidation, 1952-57, and (3) the period of overemployment.
1957-62.
The first period—during which Marshall Plan aid was received,
restrictions on industrial production were moderated or eliminated,
and the currency reform took effect—was characterized by a very
rapid rate of growth, a low marginal capital-output ratio, and in-
creasing labor productivity. During this period, a small amount of
investment could go a long way in bringing back into production
plant and equipment that had been previously idle. The problem,
as Häuser points Out, was to supply the capital needed to sustain
the recovery effort. The contribution of tax policy to the solution
of this problem took a number of forms: personal income taxes
were lowered somewhat; special depreciation allowances were
granted to businessmen or farmers who reinvested in their own en-
terprises; and in the case of businesses, only half of the income left in
the business (up to 10 per cent of total profits) was subject to personal
income tax. With the effective rate of this tax reaching 50 per cent
at the German equivalent of Häuser Out that the last
two provisions virtually compelled entrepreneurs to invest at very
high rates, although he doubts whether any additional incentive to
invest was needed. What these provisions did do, however, was to
provide additional means for investment. Both provisions were re-
pealed in 1951.
Growth continued during the period of "normalization" but at a
slower rate. By this time, expanding output required completely
new plants, a development which nearly doubled the incremental
capital-output ratio. A shortage of investment funds continued to
be the limiting factor on growth; and, with personal saving kept
low by a high propensity to consume (and low wages), three-fourths
of total saving had to come from business and government. After
the repeal of the special depreciation allowances in 1951, tax en-
couragement for investment was given only in special cases and to
encourage housing construction and shipbuilding (until1954).
Häuser points out, for example, that in certain basic goods indus-
tries where prices were still controlled, an investment incentive was
provided by permitting one-half of an investment in machinery andIntroduction and Summary 7
one-third of that in plant to be written off in three years. Moreover,
for industry generally, a shift from the straight-line to the declining-
balance method of depreciation at twice the straight-line rate was per.
mitted after 1951. Exporting was encouraged by the provision of a
tax-free reserve and by a special deduction of 1-10 per cent of export-
derived income. The main thrust of tax policy during this period,
according to Häuser, was to overcome bottlenecks and to stimulate
capital goods industries. The government's success in accomplishing
these ends reinforced the boom and spurred growth; but it also re-
sulted in some overcapacity and a slowing down of growth by 1958.
Häuser also discusses a number of measures that were adopted to
encourage personal saving. Although, at least up to 1958, these
measures were expected to make some contribution to economic
growth, they were also viewed as redressing to some extent the in-
herent inequity of the liberal investment allowances. Among the
types of savings favored by their deductibility from taxable income
in limited amounts were: savings for insurance, savings for the con-
struction of dwellings, and direct savings accounts. In certain cases,
premiums were also paid to private savers from public funds.
Fläuser concludes that this was a costly program but not a very
effective one in raising the volume of saving.
Although Häuser thinks that high income taxes may have had
some adverse effects on work incentives, especially after 1958, he
finds no evidence to support the view that these high rates have
limited the economic activity of entrepreneurs to any perceptible
degree. He suspects that the turnover tax may have impeded spe-
cialization and so prevented the optimum allocation of resources.
On the other hand, he notes certain steps that were taken by the
government to improve resource allocation, such as allowances for
the construction of new houses, the exemption of newly built
houses from local real estate taxes, and the tax incentives given for
investment in export industries and in certain basic industries, as
previously noted. Finally, Häuser calls attention to the fact that,
since 1953, distributed corporate profits have been taxed at a sub-
stantially lower rate than retained profits. By 1958, when the two
rates were 15 and 51 per cent, respectively, this split was viewed as
one of the major methods of fighting an overinvestment boom.
Häuser does not view the West German tax system as a very effec-• ••• ••V•
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tive economic stabilizer. Neither the assessed income tax nor the
corporation tax lend themselves to this purpose, mainly because the
tax liabilities arising under both of these levies are paid in quarter-
ly instalments on the basis of the previous year's income. Whereas
taxpayers normally reduce their instalments if they anticipate 'a re-
duction in income, they seldom do the opposite when the circum-
stances are reversed.
In his discussion of Hauser's paper, Fritz Neumark expresses his
agreement with the view that German tax policy contributed much
more to growth than it did to stability during the 1950's. He also
calls particular attention to the inequities in the distribution of tax
burdens and to the complexities in the tax laws that resulted from
Germany's growth-promoting tax policies. This, he says, was a tax
system that favored the wealthy. Undistributed profits represented
more than 40 per cent of total capital formation right after the war
and about 30 per cent between 1953 and 1960, and this in his opin-
ion was due in large part to the preferential tax treatment given re-
tained earnings. Neumark goes on to point Out that steps could
have been taken to correct some of these inequities if the govern-
ment had been willing to make the tax on net wealth somewhat
progressive or had been able to reform the inheritance tax.
Paul Senf, in his comments on the Häuser paper, suggests that
the main object of nearly all the tax reforms since the war has been
the relief of the German economy and that there was no conscious
growth policy during this period, any more than there was an effec-
tive stabilization policy. It was, however, generally agreed that,
whatever their purpose, the reforms of the late 1940's and early
1950's did favor economic growth. In commenting on the extent to
which the German efforts to hold down consumption and expand
investment increased the concentration of wealth in business, Senf
points out that the government sector as well as the business one
expanded its holdings during this period. This was the result of an
extraordinarily high -level of government lending, which may have
been as important in contributing to growth as the tax measures.
In the open discussion of the Häuser paper, questions were raised
about the importance of special tax concessions, such as those made
in Germany, from an incentive standpoint. It was asked whether—.Wr 7.--.- -. _--- '---V------W-r-. W ---r -- - - —' --------.-
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the liquidity effect of these concessions was not more significant,
and if so why the same result could not have been obtained by
shifting the emphasis from direct to indirect taxes. The German
conferees were, however, of the opinion that what was done was
more effective than an across-the-board reduction in income tax
would have been. There was considerable doubt as to whether there
was a direct connection between the inclination to produce more,
on the one hand, and the fiscal treatment of the payments resulting
from these activities, on the other, and consequently it was not con-
sidered absolutely necessary in the interest of economic growth to
have, say, tax exemptions for overtime payments. Nevertheless, it
was still believed that a policy of keeping the rates high and having
special incentives was more effective than one of straight rate reduc-
tion.
ITALY
Francesco Forte's report covers both the growth-retarding and the
growth-promoting features of the• Italian tax system. Although
Italy's rate of growth during the 1950's was the second highest
among the Western European nations, Forte maintains that this
impressive achievement was accomplished in spite of a fiscal system
that was in many respects an obstacle to growth. On the other
hand, he points out that many reforms were effected in direct taxa-
tion during this period and that they did make some contributions
to the country's rate of expansion. The trouble was that these fiscal
reforms were not carried far enough and were often not well
enough carried out to make a great deal of difference. The govern-
ment was trying to do the right thing; but it did not always succeed
in getting what it wanted. Much more must be done, in his opin-
ion, if Italy's progress of the past decade is to be continued.
The major factors accounting for Italy's high growth rate, accord-
ing to Forte, have been the absorption of real and disguised unem-
ployment in the South, a broadening .of consumer markets, especial-
ly for durable goods, and high profit margins which have enabled
Italian firms to finance internally a high rate of capital formation.10 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
The country was able to tap its large reservoir of unemployed or
underemployed agricultural workers in the South, both by moving
some industry into that region and by inducing the workers them-
selves to migrate to the North. As Forte points out, this has meant
higher wage payments without higher wage rates, as well as an in-
crease in labor productivity. The increasing demand for consumer
goods that was generated by this process not only necessitated the
enlargement and expansion of production facilities, but also made
possible economies of scalein the distribution process.Itis
significant that, during the 1950's, all of this was accomplished
without any increase in wholesale prices. Other circumstances favor-
ing growth at this time were an ample supply of technical person-
nel in the North, a fairly high propensity to save on the part of the
well-to-do Italians who were benefiting most from the postwar
boom, and the expansion of European and North American mar-
kets for Italian exports.
Not all sectors of the economy or all sections of the country have
shared in these gains to the same extent, according to Forte. 1n-
creases in the level of investment and of economic activity have
been greatest in the heavily industrialized sections of northern
Italy. Agriculture has lagged; and, although employment has in-
creased in trade and services, it is doubtful whether labor produc-
tivity has increased very much in either sector. On the other hand,
there have been big increases in manufacturing employment and
output, especially in steel, automobiles, engineering, and chemicals.
Forte points Out, however, that the Italian economy has encoun-
tered problems during the last few years which have tended to
slow down its rate of expansion. Wage rates have begun to rise fas-
ter than labor productivity, reducing retained earnings and forcing
the rapidly growing consumer durable goods firms into the capital
market where they have to compete with public enterprises and
with the housing industry for investment funds. Finally, rising do-
mestic costs, which have adversely affected exports, and increased
consumption of agricultural and other imported products cut down
quite sharply, in 1962, Italy's favorable balance-of-payments posi-
tion.Introduction and• Summary• 11
Turning to the Italian fiscal system, Forte notes the steady rise in
national tax revenue, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of
national income. Excluding social security levies, the yield of taxes
imposed by the national government rose from 15 per cent of na-
tional income in 1949 to 21 per cent in 1961. Local taxes, the yield
from which represented 2.8 per cent of national income in 1961,
lifted the aggregate tax burden to 23.8 per cent of national income
in that year. He also points out that, at the national level, nearly 75
per cent of the tax revenue comes from indirect taxes including the
general sales tax (IGE), which yields more than all of the direct
taxes combined. As a result, the Italian tax system tends to be quite
regressive, with the relatively slight dependence on income and
wealth taxes favoring accumulation of savings by the upper income
classes and stimulating investment by low marginal rates. On the
other hand, the relatively heavy reliance on consumption taxes has,
as Forte points out, tended to check the spending of the masses.
Furthermore, although the over-all burden of taxation was quite
high in Italy during the 1950's, public expenditures also rose sharply
as the government increased its investment in public enterprises,
highways, and education. Not only did these expenditures favor
growth, but the fact that they could be financed without recourse to
public borrowing during this period meant that the government was
not competing with private investors in the capital markets, nor
contributing to inflationary pressures by expanding the money
supply.
Entering into more detailed descriptions of the italian tax struc-
ture, Forte observes that the major part of the direct tax revenue
comes not from the direct personal tax on incomes but from the so-
called "real" taxes on movable wealth (including income from
work) and on land and buildings. Although the "movable wealth"
tax is imposed at varying rates on the different categories of income,
it affects wages and profits more than it does interest and rents. In
other words, it tends to be more of a burden on the working and en-
trepreneurial classes than on the ren tiers, a characteristic which can-
not be said to favor growth. In 1961, the revenue from "real" taxes
on land and buildings was only about one-fifth of that from movable—— — - —------ — —..--- - - -- — — —.
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wealth. Forte contends that the low yield of the land tax reflects the
inadequacies of the present assessment system and the fact that the
bulk of this tax is assessed and collected by local governments. It
tends to be heaviest in the poorest communes and provinces, and
lightest in those areas where the farmers are most prosperous. As for
the tax on buildings, Forte points out that receipts are kept down
because most old houses are still subject to rent controls and most
new ones have been granted tax exemption.
Forte argues that the "movable wealth" tax on incomes derived
from work is neither a very efficient revenue instrument, nor does it
provide a tax environment particularly favorable to economic
growth. Even though this tax was personalized and its method of
assessment modernized by the tax reforms introduced by Ezio Vano-
ni in 1951, it is still widely evaded, especially by self-employed busi-
ness or professional persons. The fact that small businesses are fa-
vored, both by more moderate assessments and by lower rates, tends
to penalize growth and to preserve small and inefficient business
units. Firms of the latter type may or may not be taxed on the basis
of their accounts, and even when they do choose to present their ac-
counts, these frequently are quite unreliable; even among the larger
firms, there have been large margins of evasion.
Perhaps the most unsatisfactory of the direct taxes, according to
Forte, is the progressive personal tax on incomes which, although
legally imposed at rates ranging from 2 to 70 per cent, is widely
evaded. Income in the form of interest, dividends, and the distrib-
uted profits of closely held companies generally escapes tax because
no satisfactory method has been found for assessing these types of
income. The courageous attempt in 1956 to force stockholders to
report their investments only served to drive capital out of the
country. Although, as Forte points out, much of this capital subse-
quently came back to Italy as foreign capital, it did not generally
flow back into the market for shares.
Italy's general sales tax (IGE) is a turnover tax imposed at a gen-
eral rate of &8 per cent; but Forte points out that there are a cer-
tain number of "increased" and "reduced" rates, as well as a system
of "condensed" rates which are imposed at a single stage in the pro-
duction process of certain products as rough equivalents for the—! r - wn..n...nr — ———w-.-. 'yr. -V ,flr.r."
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multiple-stage levies that they replace. This has resulted in a tre-
mendous variety of rates, and dissatisfaction with such a highly
differentiated tax system has prompted an increasing number of
persons to urge the substitution of a value-added tax and a single-
stage tax on sales for the present IGE. Such a combination would,
according to Forte, have the advantage of a broader coverage, and
allow a more rational policy toward differentiation to be followed.
Turning to some specific features of the Italian tax system which
may have made a positive contribution to that country's economic
growth, Forte discusses the effects of the "corporation tax," the spe-
cial allowances for accelerated depreciation, and the assortment of
special tax provisions adopted to spur economic development in the
South and to increase investment in the depressed areas of central
northern Italy.
Unlike most levies of this name, the Italian "corporation tax,"
which was enacted in 1954, is not a tax on corporate profits as such.
Instead, it consists of an annual tax of .75 per cent on invested capi-
tal (capital stock, surplus) and an excess profits tax of 15 per cent
on taxable income after allowing a credit of 6 per cent of invested
capital. In addition, a tax rate of 0.5 per cent is applied to the
value of .bonds and debentures outstanding at the end of the fiscal
year. Forte points out that this tax on companies tends to favor new
and low-earning enterprises, but that it has a disincentive effect
once a firm crosses a certain threshold. After a finn is earning a rate
of return on its invested capital of about 9 per cent (before taking
the deduction for the "movable wealth" tax and other "real" taxes),
additional profit is taxed quite heavily, and this is said to dampen
interest in risky ventures. Another serious fault that Forte finds
with this tax is that it does not differentiate between the ren tier
type of activity carried on by real estate and investment companies
and the entrepreneur type engaged in by industrial and commercial
enterprises. He contends that the law, in effect, fav.ors the former
whereas, from the standpoint of economic growth, it ought to be
the other way around.
Forte points out that Italy's accelerated depreciation allowances
have taken two fonns: (1) a permanent provision pennitting the pe-
riod of depreciation to be shortened by not more than two-fifths, in14 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
the case of new facilities or where existing facilities have been
transformed, reconstructed, or improved; and (2) a temporary pro-
vision granting initial allowances for new investments, subject to an
income limitation. The first of these provisions, which was intro-
duced in 1951, was viewed as a method of liberalizing the deprecia-
tion provisions in the Italian law which, up to that time, had been
quite restrictive and permitted use only of the straight-line method
based on historic cost. The second provision, which was adopted for
three years in 1956, granted, for the "real" taxes on profits, an al-
lowance of 10 per cent of the cost of new installations over and
above the normal and accelerated depreciation allowances; but the
additional allowance could not exceed 5 per cent of reported in-
come and it could be taken only by enterprises that were required
(or willing) to be taxed on the basis of their "accounts." In this way
the government hoped to encourage small enterprises to submit to
the preferred assessment method.
The initial allowance, which may be taken in the year of expen-
diture and in each of the two succeeding years, has been continued
in effect by virtue of repeated three-year extensions of the original
statute. Forte contends that the clause limiting the allowance to a
stated percentage of reported income discriminates against growing
enterprises and favors very large ones. Furthermore, he questions
whether the government's attempt to achieve both assessment re-
form and growth objectives by means of this particular provision
was well conceived. He does not, however, undertake to assess the
effectiveness of these accelerated depreciation provisions in spurring
investment.
The methods which have been adopted to encourage investment
in southern Italy include a ten-year exemption from the "movable
wealth" tax of the business income of eligible industrial enterprises
located in that region and a 50 per cent reduction in the rate of this
tax on business income earned anywhere in Italy if such income is
invested in the South. Exemption from customs duties has also been
granted for machinery imported from abroad for installation' in
southern enterprises. It is Forte's view that the results of these spe-
cial tax concessions in stimulating industrial growth have been
quite modest.Introduction and Summary 15
Siro Lombardini, in commenting on the Forte paper, is even
more pessimistic about the effectiveness of tax exemption in pro-
moting regional development. If some form of government inter-
vention is needed to achieve a more balanced growth of the Italian
economy, he would favor the use of direct subsidies which could be
administered more flexibly and with more telling effect on invest-
ment decisions. In response to this argument, Forte expressed the
view that it was still too early to judge the effectiveness of this legis-
lation. He felt that investment in the South was becoming more
profitable because of the shortage of manpower and the congestion
in northern Italy, and that more businesses were becoming aware of
the tax advantages to be enjoyed by locating in that region.
During the open discussion of the Forte paper, it was observed
that the Italian experience seemed to suggest that there was very
little connection between the rationality of a country's tax system
and its rate of growth. The rates of growth in countries like the
United States and the United Kingdom, which appear to have rela-
tively rational tax systems, are not altogether satisfactory; while in
Italy, where the tax system is admittedly quite irrational and quite
inequitable, a high rate of growth is found.
THE NETHERLANDS
In his analysis of the role which tax policy has played in promoting
postwar economic growth in the Netherlands, Cornelis Goedhart
gives particular attention to the methods adopted to insure an ade-
quate level of national saving, since this, rather than the stimula-
tion of investment, has been the main problem in that country. He
points out that the Netherlands has had to have a high level of in-
vestment in order to guarantee employment and to provide a rising
real per capita income for a population that was increasing some-
what more rapidly than in other EEC countries. This need was in-
creased by the unfavorable capital-output ratio.
Fortunately, the Netherlands was favored during this period by a
sufficiently high rate of expansion of total effective demand to in-
duce the necessary level of investment. since exports of goods. -.--, r'n- r—-—r —
- -'v.._ 9.nw,r ,
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and services account for 50-55 per cent of national income, this in-
crease in total effective demand depended to a considerable extent
on the ability of the Dutch export industries to maintain their com-
petitive position in world markets. This, in turn, depended on the
willingness of Dutch wage-earners to exercise self-restraint in their
wage demands and to let the government have the final say in es-
tablishing wage levels. Indeed, Goedhart asserts that this instru-
ment of wage policy "was the most important growth-furthering
tool in the hands of the government" during the 1950's.
But he goes on to point out that a high and rising level of total
effective demand could not guarantee that sufficient savings would
be available to finance economic growth in the Netherlands, and
that it was to further this objective that fiscal policy, and particu-
larly tax policy, had an important role to play.
According to Goedhart, a major influence on savings in the Neth-
erlands since the war has been the policy of financing a high pro-
portion of government outlays from tax revenue. In other words, it
has been the aim of the government to maintain as high a ratio as
possible of saving (and investment) to national income by a high
level of "tax-forced savings" through the national budget. He recog-
nizes that not all of this has been net gain, but he presumes that
private saving is less affected by taxation than by loan finance.
Goedhart also stresses a fundamental rule of Dutch budget policy
since 1959 that the rate of increase in the central government's ex-
penditures should be smaller than the rate of increase in national
income. This rule, which calls for a greater reduction of tax rates
than would be necessary to eliminate the effects of progression
alone, reflects the government's view that some lowering of both av-
erage and marginal rates is necessary if economic growth is not to
be endangered by harmful negative incentive effects. Since the end
of the war, the Netherlands tax system has drawn a high proportion
of its revenues from direct taxes and has emphasized tax equity
through the principle of progression. Although, as Goedhart points
out, rates have been reduced considerably over the past ten to
fifteen years, it has been those with low incomes who have benefited
most from these reductions. For middle and upper income families,
tax rate reductions have been more modest and have been substan--, —- — .-- — F — - — -- ---. — —
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tially offset by rising prices so that, for comparable real incomes,
the reduction in tax burdens has been much less than it might ap-
pear. Although the current budget policy of the Netherlands im-
plies that an increasing part of future increases in real national in-
come will be earmarked for private rather than for government
spending, Goedhart states that it is too soon to say how effectively
this policy will be carried Out.
Actually, he finds that tax policy has made little contribution to
personal saving since the war. As noted above, effective rates in the
middle and upper income classes have not been significantly re-
duced, and the special measures adopted to encourage small private
savings have not, in Goedhart's opinion, added much to total sav-
ing, even though they have had some effect on the savings habits of
many persons. For example, he mentions the tax exemption granted
individuals on premiums paid for pensions and life annuities up to
a maximum of f 3,600 a year, which has resulted in an enormous
influx of savings to life insurance companies and pension funds; he
also mentions the exemption granted on special premiums offered
to encourage young people to save.
It is Goedhart's view that tax incentives to encourage private sav-
ing have been considerably more effective when they have been di-
rected at raising the level of business saving. Investment rebates and
accelerated depreciation allowances are cited as the most important
devices of this type. The fonner originally permitted business firms
to deduct from their taxable profits 4 per cent of the total cost of
new durable production facilities for five successive years, without
any reduction of the basis of these assets for purposes of deprecia-
tion. The terms under which these rebates are granted have been
changed from time to time, and the right to take them was with-
drawn altogether from November 1956 until May 1958, as an anti-
inflation measure. Since 1960, two 5 per cent rebates have been al-
lowed. Accelerated depreciation in the Netherlands has taken the
form of an initial allowance which may be taken as soon as an
order is placed for a depreciable asset. The percentage of total cost
which could be taken as an initial allowance has been changed from
time to time; originally, it was per cent; but since April 1960,
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factories and 81/3 per cent on certain other means of production.
Still another savings-stimulating device mentioned by Goedhart is
the provision permitting tax-free reserves to be set up for future
losses and expenses.
Although Goedhart finds that investment income has been very
heavily burdened in the Netherlands, especially at the highest in-
come levels, he does not think that the effects of this have been too
serious up to the present. It is his opinion that the corporation tax
has probably been shifted to a considerable extent, and he finds lit-
tle evidence that there has been any substantial tax flight of well-to-
do persons from the Netherlands because of high personal income
tax rates. Nevertheless, he recognizes the possibility that the combi-
nation of high corporate and individual income taxes could endan-
ger investment in the future. In this connection, he mentions the
government's proposal to reduce the company tax on distributed
profits by 15 per cent in order to improve the functioning of the
capital market in directing savings to those firms which can use
them most effectively.
In commenting further on the impact of taxation on incentives
in the Netherlands, Goedhart refers to studies made by the Central
Planning Bureau, particularly to the Bureau's finding that the
short-run effect of a tax-induced demand expansion on investments
can be attributed in large part to the resulting tightening of the
labor market, which in turn stimulates labor-saving investments. He
concludes from this that, in the long run, a rapid increase in total
demand will probably increase incentives for both capital widening
and capital deepening.
Goedhart's general conclusion is that investment in the Nether-
lands since the war has been increased by tax rules favoring the use
of retained business earnings for reinvestment and allowing unre-
stricted compensation of initial losses. On the other hand, he notes
the negative incentive effect of highly progressive personal income
tax rates and expresses some fear that the reaction to these is be-
coming stronger.
•J. van Hoorn, Jr., in his comments on the Goedhart paper, first
questions whether the Netherlands has been altogether right in its
use of tax policy to promote public saving. While recognizing that—— -— — •_••• • u.. ...
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there are certain types of activities which the government has to en-
gage in and for which funds have to be raised, he contends that in
other areas the question ought to be whether the government or
private enterprise can do the job more efficiently. He wonders,
therefore, whether it is necessarily true that public savings will have
to be larger in volume than private savings. He also notes that most
of the tax measures that have been adopted to encourage private
saving and private investment have encouraged investment in exist-
ing businesses. Why, he asks, should the private investor not be free
to make his own choice?
Van Hoorne also finds fault with the Netherlands government's
heavy reliance on progressive income and wealth taxes while striv-
ing for a high savings-investment ratio. Pointing out that resources
used in both private and public investment must be at the expense
of consumption, he asks whether more weight should not be given
to taxes on consumption, such as the turnover tax. Finally, on in-
centive taxation, he expresses some skepticism about the effects
which the various special provisions have had on the level of invest-
ment and wonders whether a generally lower level of taxation
might not accomplish about as much.
A. J. van den Tempel, the second commentator on the Goedhart
paper, questions whether tax policy was, or should have been, di-
rected exclusively at insuring an adequate level of national saving.
While he admits that investment presented no problem from 1953
through the late 1950's, he argues that this was not the situation
earlier when many of the special provisions which Goedhart dis-
cusses were as important as investment stimulants as they were in
promoting a high savings ratio.
Van den Tempel is also unable to agree fully with the emphasis
Goedhart attaches to the 1959 rule of Dutch budget policy. Al-
though the principle of not allowing public expenditures to rise as
fast as national income is expressed in economic terms, van den
Tempel argues that it was politically inspired. As an economic ar-
gument, it would hold up only if it could be demonstrated that
high income taxes had significant disincentive effects, and he ques-
tions whether such a demonstration has been or can be made. Al-
though he too is skeptical about the value of tax incentives, van20 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
den Tempel calls attention to the poweEful effect that such mea-
surés can have under the right circumstances. At times when busi-
nessmen are uncertain about the course they should follow, the im-
plied advice they get from the government in the form of a tax
concession can, he suggests, have a positive impact on spending and
investment decisions.
As for the role that wage policy has played in promoting econom-
ic growth in the Netherlands, van den Tempel points out that this
policy did have one serious disadvantage in that it provided no in-
centive for labor-saving investments and tended to overstimulate
capital-widening ones. This produced a very tight labor market,
which in turn brought about wage increases.
In reply to van loom's question about his apparent preference
for public over private savings, Goedhart stated what he believed
to be the philosophy of the Dutch government on this issue, which
was simply to choose a level of taxation that was in harmony with
the facts. Given the assumed percentage increases in population and
labor productivity, the planned level of current and capital expen-
ditures in the public sector, and the propensity to save in the pri-
vate sector, the level of taxes has to be high enough to enable pub-
lic and private investment to be covered by the sum of public and
private saving. To the extent that private savings can be stimulated
by tax incentive measures, tax-forced saving can be reduced.
While sharing to some extent the skepticism expressed by his dis-
cussants about the effectiveness of tax policy in promoting economic
growth, Goedhart was still inclined to believe that there was at least
one important thing which tax policy could do, namely, to prevent
bottlenecks, and especially those arising from insufficient savings,
notably from profits. Adequate internal financing was, he felt, a
prerequisite for economic growth.
FRANCE
In his study Pierre Tabatoni undertakes to describe the significant
part. which France's tax system has played in the pursuit of its
growth objectives since 1950. These objectives first came into sharpIntroduction and Summary 21
focus in1952, when France embarked on a program to curb
inflationary tendencies and spur economic growth by freeing trade,
encouraging the repatriation of capital that had taken refuge
abroad, stimulating the growth of voluntary saving, and integrating
more effectively investment efforts in both the public and private
sectors. Efforts to increase productivity were aimed primarily at in-
creasing the capital coefficient, although it was recognized that the
investment effort would have to be supported by changes in organi-
zation and management techniques, which included greater research
and development efforts, improved distribution techniques, and
better education and professional training. The program itself was
the expression of a "master idea," that of voluntary, flexible nation-
al economic planning.
Although experimentation with new tax techniques could not be
allowed to endanger tax yields at a time when inflationary pressures
could not be ignored, there were a number of important reforms
made in the French tax system during this period. These reforms,
according to Tabatoni, were aimed at three main objectives: sim-
plification, neutrality, and increasing the effectiveness of the system
as an instrument of economic policy. It was recognized that com-
plexity in taxation entourages fraud; that, in the absence of tax
neutrality, decisions are distorted; and that limited use might still
be made of tax incentive measures, even though they might make
•the system less simple and less neutral. The major changes in-
volved the conversion of the schedular income tax into a progres-
sive global tax on the net income of individuals and a proportional
tax on corporations; the transformation of a complex turnover tax
system into a tax on value added (T.V.A.) and a tax on services;
and the introduction of a number of provisions into the tax law to
encourage business saving and investment. Among the latter, Taba-
toni mentions supplemental depreciation allowances and the recog-
nition of the declining-balance method, tax deferral on gains rein-
vested in, depreciable facilities, tax-free revaluation of fixed assets,
and loss carryovers.
Although France's average real rate of growth during the 1950's
was 4.2 per cent, Tabatoni points out that there was some uneven-
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growth." He attributes the more rapid rate of growth attained in
some of these periods to increases in consumer demand, that in
others to private capital formation, and that in still others to in-
creases in export demand. In some years, combinations of two or
more of these demands are found. He then considers the part that
tax policy may have played in stimulating or contributing to these
major components of total effective demand.
As for private consumption, Tabatoni observes that, paradoxical-
ly, the level of consumption appears to have increased with the tax
burden. Although he assumes that both direct and indirect taxation
must have influenced personal savings, he has not been able to mea-
sure the impact of these taxes in this respect. Tabatoni recognizes
that there is a "tradition of tax evasion" in France, but he concludes
that the actual tax burden must be smaller than the theoretical one,
even without taking evasion into account. The fact that capital
gains are not taxed is also seen as a contributing factor. Finally, in-
dividual income tax exemptions on certain types of interest income'
and the exemption of life insurance premiums (up to 10 per cent of
income) may also have contributed in a small way.
As for the impact of taxation on investment demand, Tabatoni
cites a number of special provisions, some of which were mentioned
above, which could have increased total investment or could have
directed capital formation into specific areas. Among these provi-
sions, he calls particular attention to the treatment of investment
expenditures under the value-added tax. Whereas under the pre-
vious system of production taxes capital goods were taxed both
when they were purchased and when they were depreciated, under
the value-added tax system producers may deduct from their
monthly value-added tax payments the value-added tax already
paid on all acquisitions of industrial plant, machinery, and equip-
ment. Evidence to support the view that this change promoted capi-
tal formation is found by Tabatoni in the sharp upturn in invest-
ment which followed the enactment of the T.V.A. in 1954.
Export demand is also stimulated by the exemption of export
firms from the T.V.A. According to Tabatoni, this gives French
products a tax advantage amounting to about 25 per cent of total
cost, an advantage which they did not enjoy under the previous sys-Introduction and Summary 23
ternof indirect taxes. Exporters have also benefited from special ac-
celerated depreciation privileges given them in 1957 and from their
ability to accumulate special tax-free reserves to cover the risks in-
curred in extending medium-term export credits.
In addition to its effects on the demand for final output, Tabato-
ni finds that tax policy has also affected the ability of French firms
to finance their investment outlays. Although public investment ac-
counted for about one-fourth of total investment during the period
under consideration, this was concentrated mainly in the construc-
tion, transportation and communication, and power sectors. In pri-
vate manufacturing, trade, and tourism, less than 12 per cent of the
funds used were found to have come from the major government
lending agency. Hence, in these sectors the effects of taxation on pri-
vate financing of investment is still considered significant. Nothing
very precise can, however, be said about the general effects of taxa-
tion in this connection. According to Tabatoni, the prevalence of
tax fraud among small- and medium-sized businesses and the lack of
knowledge about the ability of business firms to shift their taxes
prevent him from judging the real impact of these taxes. He does
point out that the French capital market is so narrow that only a
few powerful firms have access to it and that a high percentage of
all the financing done by French businesses has to be done internal-
ly. He thinks that the tax system may be one reason for this because
it reinforces the individual saver's inclination to keep his saving in
liquid or semiliquid forms; but this is about as far as he goes in
linking the general structure of taxation to the financing of invest-
ment.
On the other hand, more is known about the effects of special
provisions in the French tax law on the ability of business firms to
finance their investments internally. Tabatoni points out that many
types of tax-free reserves are available, of which depreciation re-
serves account for nearly three-fourths. He also notes that large cor-
porations appear to be better able to take advantage of these re-
serve provisions than the smaller firms. Since 1960, all taxpayers
have been able to use the declining-balance method for new assets
other than residential and office buildings. He finds, however, that
a large number of business firms have not elected to take advantage24 ForeignTax Policies and Economic Growth
of this option. A similar situation is noted with respect to the pro-
vision which permits the revaluation of depreciable assets; revalua-
tion profits are exempt from profits taxes but a tax of 3 per cent is
imposed on the reserve. Tabatoni reports that a relatively limited
use has been made of this privilege by businesses in genera!, al-
though one-third of the corporations have done so. Among small
businesses, failure to take advantage of this provision may be due to
ignorance, to the complexity of the system and the expense it en-
tails, or to the fact that the 3 per cent tax on revaluation reserves
may constitute a financial burden. Finally, attention is called to the
provision in the French tax code which exempts capital gains real-
ized upon the sale of business assets if the firm undertakes to rein-
vest the sales proceeds within three years. Since the gains must be
earmarked for use as reserves against the depreciation of fixed in-
vestments, Tabatoni observes that this exemption is, in effect, a
form of accelerated depreciation.
Recognizing that productivity may be increased by the discovery
of new products and methods of production and by the adoption of
better management techniques, the French government has adopted
a number of special tax measures designed to encourage scientific
research and a greater degree of business concentration. Tabatoni
mentions in this connection the special depreciation allowances
granted to stimulate investment in research facilities, the favorable
treatment of patents, and the use of special measures to promote
mergers and the participation by small firms in cooperative ven-
tures in such fields as market research and accounting.
Tabatoni concludes that the new tax techniques adopted during
the 1950's have encouraged business firms in France to draw on in-
ternal sources for the financing of investemnt, that they have con-
tributed to improved management techniques by encouraging mer-
gers and other forms of business consolidation, and that they have
strengthened the position of French firms in foreign markets. Under
the present tax system, business enterprises enjoy increased auton-
omy and a greater competitive potential.
In their comments on the Tabatoni paper, Robert Liebaut and
D. de la Martinière stress the contribution which the T.V.A. has
made to economic growth in France. This levy, which de IaIntroduction and Summary 25
Martinièreregards as a general taxonincome measured by expen-
diture, is said to promote growth not only by the encouragement it
gives to savings but also because it lends itself less readily to fraudu-
lent practices than the income tax, and so avoids the distortions
which result from such practices. Furthermore, given the proneness
of the French taxpayer to tax evasion, the fact that the opportuni-
ties for tax fraud are fewer in the value-added tax than they are in
the income tax makes the former a fairer tax on the whole. And,
since the tax burden increases progressively as expenditure covers a
lesser proportion of foodstuffs (taxed at low rates) and a larger pro-
portion of luxuries (taxed at higher ones), this tax is said to be
based on the principle of ability to pay.
SWEDEN
Inthe introduction to their report, Leif Mutén and Karl Faxén
takeexception to the tendency found among some tax experts to
overstate the effects of tax measures upon the economic actions of
firms and individuals. Pointing out that economic growth presup-
poses the interaction of a number of factors including research, edu-
cation, capital formation, and rationalization, they contend that
there is still much to be learned about the growth process itself and
the extent to which it can be influenced by tax policy. Even in the
case of those tax policies which are presumed to have a significant
impact on the economic growth, they note that there is some un-
certainty about the actual impact of these policies. Special deprecia-
tion allowances may stimulate not only productive investments but
also investments which contribute little to growth; and laws which
permit business concerns to build up large "hidden" reserves through
generous inventory valuation methods may releasefunds for
growth-promoting investments, although the practice of tying up
capitalinstocks will not necessarily promote growth.
Mutén and also find in current discussions of economic
growth some differences of opinion on the specific kinds of tax ac-
tions that are called for if growth is to be stimulated. They note,
for example, that some writers view savings, and others investment,-
- —
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as the crucial factor requiring a tax stimulus. They do not consider
it their task to analyze these problems. Instead, they undertake to
summarize Sweden's experience with a number of specific measures
which are usually regarded as growth-stimulating. But they warn
the reader in advance that, since a major portion of capital forma-
tion in Sweden takes place in the public sector, the question of the
effect of the tax system on the propensity to save is not a matter of
much interest in that country, except insofar as it applies to saving
in special sectors such as small businesses. They also ask the reader to
bear in mind that Sweden's rate of growth during the 1950's, al-
though higher than that of the United Kingdom, was well below that
of any other country represented at the Conference. This suggests to
them that Swedish applications of growth-promoting tax measures
could not have had any very remarkable consequences.
Among the special features of the Swedish tax system which
might have been expected to have some effect on that country's rate
of growth, the two which have aroused the most interest abroad
have probably been the "free" depreciation system, which was in
effect from 1938 to 1951, and the "investment reserve" system,
which has been in effect since 1955. Mutén and Faxén point out
that neither of these systems, at the time it was adopted, was re-
garded as a growth-stimulating measure. By adopting free deprecia-
tion, the Swedish government hoped to eliminate conflicts between
taxpayers and tax administrators over correct depreciation rates,
while the investment reserve device was intended to serve as a
means of leveling Out cyclical fluctuations by changing the timing
of capital outlays. Both of these systems did, however, come to have
some significance for growth.
Although the statute permitting corporations and economic asso-
ciations to write off their investments in machinery and equipment
as rapidly as they desired could mean a significant saving of interest
through tax deferral and could, therefore, have given these enter-
prises added incentives to invest in such assets, Mutén and Faxén
contend that the more important effect of this provision was its
contribution to corporate liquidity. On the other hand, they criti-
cize the free depreciation rule for having favored long-term invest-
ments over short-term ones, investment in machinery over invest-—T
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mentin buildings, and firmsmakingprofits over firms losing money
or new firms. Finally, the fact that free depreciation was available
only to corporations and could not be used by unincorporated en•
terprises suggests to them that, in its bias against new and small
businesses, this rule may have promoted industrial concentration.
Mutén and Faxén are unable to say much about the extent to
which free depreciation did actually stimulate economic growth in
Sweden during the period when it was in effect. They report that, at
least until after the war, the provision was rarely used to its full ex-
tent. During the postwar investment boom it was used more exten-
sively although, even then, it is believed to have given corporations
little more than what they would have been allowed under a replace-
ment value depreciation formula. Mutén and Faxén note that
Sweden had a system of rather rigorous investment controls in
operation during this period. Since these controls applied mainly
to buildings, the government was in effect curbing this type of
investment while stimulating it in machinery and equipment (es-
pecially in shipbuilding). It is suggested that this policy may not
have led to the most efficient allocation of resources. Ultimately,
the expansionary effects of free depreciation became too strong
and, as a countercyclical measure, severe restrictions upon its use
had to be introduced in 1951. These restrictions became perma-
nent in 1955, at which time a new set of depreciation rules was
adopted.
Under the new system of depreciation all business firms have
the option of taking a straight-line depreciation at a 20 per cent
rate or of using a declining-balance formula, which makes it pos-
sible for them to write off slightly more than half of the cost of
a machine during the first two years of its life. In assessing the
effects of these new rules on investment, Mutén and Faxén note
that the reduction of the first-year allowance from 100 per cent
under the free depreciation rule to either 30 or 20 per cent under
the new ones means that the taxpayer has to raise more money
under the latter than he was required to under the former. On
the other hand, they find no great difference between the old sys-
tem and the new from the standpoint of long-term investment.
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effective corporate rate computed as a percentage of corporate
"real" income with depreciation taken according to accepted stan-
dards of cost accounting. The more rapid the expansion, the
greater the reduction tends to be, a feature of the tax system which
provides a strong incentive for Swedish corporations to make capi-
tal accumulation a major policy objective.
Mutén and observe that the usefulness of the investment
reesrve system in evening out cyclical movements was not tested
until the recession of 1958-59, at which time it proved to be an
effective instrument for encouraging investment, especially after the
rules governing its use had been relaxed to cover firms planning
major projects running over more than two years. They cite its
effective use again in 1962-63 and note the addition of a 10 per cent
investment deduction in the latter year, as well as the introduction
of another new provision permitting investment reserves to be used
to finance the production of goods to be kept in stock.
In their assessment of the investment reserve system, Mutén and
Faxén stress its importance as an anticyclical device; but they con-
tend that it has also had some effect on growth. It is their view that
investment reserves have been used not only to accelerate already
planned investment programs but also to undertake low-priority in-
vestments that were made attractive by cheap financing. On the
other hand, they find no evidence that businessmen have gone so
far as to let their investment reserves serve as the normal medium
for financing ordinary investment programs, a development that
could have had adverse consequences from the standpoint of both
stability and growth. There is, however, one criticism of both the
free depreciation and the investment reserve systems that does ap-
pear to them to have some validity, namely, that by making self-
financing easier for some firms and for certain types of investments,
they have encouraged overinvestment by those firms and in the
types of assets covered by these systems.
Mutén and Faxén note that, in addition to the special provisions
that have made it easier for Swedish firms to finance their invest-
ments, the general tax rules of that country have encouraged con-
servative dividend policies. They cite, in particular, the absence of
any relief from the double taxation of corporate dividends, the fact
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capital gains are not subject to tax after five years. They also point
out that Swedish tax rules not only assist new expanding companies
but also make it attractive for them to be absorbed into larger cor-
porations. The treatment of capital gains and the liberal rules on
salary deductions for managers of closely held companies encourage
the build-up of small firms, while the ability of such firms later to
transfer their profits to an acquiring corporation free of tax makes
mergers attractive.
In the concluding section of their report, Mutén and Faxén dis-
cuss in some detail the relationship between the tax deferral oppor-
tunities available to corporations under the Swedish corporate
profits tax and the rate of growth in the corporate sector. They
refer to a study of these relationships which is currently being made
by the Royal Commission on Taxation, and some of the prelimi-
nary results of statistical analyses are examined and compared with
those derived from a theoretical model. Although the data collected
and analyzed by the Royal Commission are found to give only
vague indications of the relation between the rules for tax deferral
and economic growth, they do suggest that the firms which fully ex-
ploit their tax deferral opportunities are more profitable than those
that do not, and that—perhaps because of this—they also bear the
heavier tax burdens. These data also suggest that growing corpora-
tioris are more profitable and invest more than stagnant ones, but
that growing corporations are more heavily burdened with taxes if
they are also large corporations but not if they are small ones.
In his comments on the Mutén-Faxén paper, Claes Sandels notes
that tax deferral may impair the free flow in the market of busi-
nesses as going concerns. He urges that this should be kept in mind
when comparisons are made between the advantages of more liberal
deferral rules and equivalent reductions in the corporate rate. Al-
though he recognizes that investment reserves serve an important
countercyclical purpose, Sandels contends that it is too generous a
subsidy to be used continuously. Furthermore, he questions the de-
sirability of continuing to use this particular device, even for pur-
poses of stabilization, and suggests that an investment credit or a
system based on depreciation allowances would be less complicated
and would serve as well. In most respects, however, Sandels finds the
Swedish .tax system to be reasonably neutral with respect to business-'
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transactions of various sorts. The principal exception is the corpo-
ration income tax which, in his opinion, places an extra burden on
incorporated enterprises.
Lars Nabseth criticizes Mutén and Faxén for not having given
more attention to the impact of budget policy on Sweden's econom-
ic development. He calls particular attention to the fact that gov-
ernment saving declined during the late 1950's, which made it more
difficult for the industrial and housing sectors to borrow in the cap-
ital market. Then, when the country switched to the general turn-
over or retail sales tax, the budget was again balanced. But since
this tax is imposed not only on consumption goods but also on
plant, machinery, and building materials, Nabseth points out that
it cannot be used as an instrument to fav.or investment against con-
sumption, or vice versa.
Nabseth next calls attention to the very considerable extent to
which Swedish industry financed its investments during the 1950's
from internal sources. While he concedes that this may have result-
ed in some misallocation of investment resources, he suggests that
the situation may be quite different during the 1960's. Given the
likelihood of more cost inflation and modifications in the tax laws
that will make internal financing less easy, Swedish firms, he argues,
may well find themselves short of investment funds and may find it
difficult to make up these deficiencies in the capital market. This
may require changes which will make it easier for companies to go
into the stock market.
Finally, he comments on the statement by Mutén and Faxén to
the effect that the Swedish tax system stimulates the establishment
and growth of small firms. He agrees that the present system makes
it possible for the owners of small companies to save money within
the firm until they are ready to sell out to another corporation.
Then they can take out their profits in the form of a capital gain.
But he argues that if these small dynamic enterprises are all taken
up by the big corporations, this will lead to an excessive degree of
concentration.
In the open discussion of the Swedish paper, one of the conferees
called attention to certain important similarities between the Swed-
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taxation and both provide opportunities for escaping these high tax
burdens through certain kinds of saving and investment. While it
was agreed that the two systems were strikingly similar in this gen-
eral respect, differences in the way each applied the so-called penal-
ty-rewarci system were pointed Out. In the distribution of conces-
sions, it was observed that the Swedish concentrated more on busi-
ness and less on individuals, and more on investment and less on
saving.
There was also some discussion of the Swedish government's will-
ingness to facilitate corporate expansion, particularly in the form of
large publicly held corporations. It was pointed out, however, that
a large corporation in Sweden was not necessarily a large corpora-
tion by international standards and that in any case the large pub-
licly held enterprise is regarded as more socialistic than the small
family firm. Some doubt was expressed about the extent to which
the Swedish tax system could actually stimulate economic growth by
making the tax burden lower for expanding firms than for stagnant
ones. It was admitted that, with a given volume of investment, it is
better for growth if more of this is allocated to firms with higher
profits and with better opportunities for growth; but it was recog-
nized that there is a limit to what can be accomplished by this kind
of policy. Tax considerations are not the only ones affecting invest-
ment decisions, and in a country like Sweden the lack of skilled
technicians, and of manpower generally, was thought to be a more
effective limit on expansion than a shortage of capital.
BRITAIN
AlthoughGreat Britain experienced the slowest rate of economic
growth during the 1950's of any of the countries represented at the
Conference, this does not appear to have been the result either of
failure to recognize the problem or of unwillingness to try to do
something about it. In his paper, Alan Williams points out that the
British government did indulge in a certain amount of fiscal experi-
mentation during this period and that this did accomplish some-
thing in the way of increased capital formation. He concedes that32 ForeignTax Policies and Economic Growth
the growth aspect of these policy measures has usually been inci-
dental to their main purpose and that the over-all impact of tax
policy on Britain's growth prospects has been "erratic and rather
haphazard." But this does not trouble him too much, since he fears
that Great Britain may be tempted to rely too much rather than
too little upon tax policy to promote economic growth.
Williams directs most of his attention to those tax policies which
might have been expected to have some impact on saving and in-
vestment decisions, and so indirectly on growth through capital for-
mation. These include the differentiation (until 1958) between dis-
tributed and undistributed corporate profits, the various capital re-
covery allowances, and the tax measures on innovation and risk-bear-
ing. He touches only briefly on certain other aspects of taxation
such as the effect of income tax on work incentives. He finds that
the lower rate at which undistributed profits were taxed before 1958
encouraged the retention, but not necessarily the reinvestment, of
profits, and that the substitution of a uniform rate for a dif-
ferentiated one at that time caused some reduction in corporate
saving, although this appears to have been offset by the increase in
personal savings that occurred at about the same time. He also re-
ports evidence that investment decisions have been materially
affected by favorable changes in investment and initial allowances,
although the impact of these changes was found to have been much
greater on large firms than on small ones and also much greater on
growing firms than on more or less Static ones. As for the impact of
the tax structure on technical progress, Williams notes that the lib-
eral provisions permitting the costs of scientific research—including
60 per cent of the cost of capital assets used in such research—to be
expensed and losses to be carried forward should have provided
ample encouragement for progressive firms. He thinks that Great
Britain's favorable treatment of capital gains also should have fa-
vored innovation and risk-taking, but that estate duties may have
cut into the capital resources of some unincorporated family busi-
nesses.
•In reporting on the effects of the substitution of a uniform tax
rate for the previously differentiated rate on corporate profits, Wi!-
hams notes that profit distributions have increased since the change,Introduction and Summary
and most sharply among the unquoted private companies. Al-
though this decline in corporate saving was more than offset by an
increase in personal saving, be thinks that the latter development
can be attributed only in part to increased profit distributions. He
also notes a marked decline in company savings-investment ratios
since 1959, as well as company savings-income ratios and the abso-
lute level of corporate savings, and an increasing tendency for listed
companies to go to the market for funds needed to purchase tangi-
ble fixed assets and to rely on short-term credit for the financing of
inventories. Although Williams finds, that these effects have varied
according to the size and to the rate of growth of the firms in-
volved, he concludes that the abolition of the differential profits tax
would not have led to an increase in the profits distribution of firms
bent on growth unless they had wanted to improve their distribu-
tion image in the market. Williams also thinks it unlikely that
there have been many cases where inability to obtain financing has
prevented worthwhile physical investments from being made.
In his discussion of Great Britain's capital allowances, Williams
focuses his attention mainly on the effects which the initial and the
capital allowances have had on investment decisions. He points out
that the initial allowances—which have ranged from as much as 20
per cent on new mining works to as little as 5 per cent on fuel-sav-
ing plants—are usually viewed as interest-free loans, while the in-
vestment allowances—which have run as high as 40 per cent on
ships and as low as 10 per cent on industrial buildings—are re-
garded as concealed subsidies. The principal difference between
them is, of course, that the initial allowance does, and the invest-
ment allowance does not, reduce the basis of an asset for future
depreciation. Williams reports that positive responses to these al-
lowances have been found in a number of independent surveys, al-
though the percentage of firms responding appears to have been
surprisingly low. This may have been the result of a faulty apprais-
al of the situation by some businessmen or it may have been be-
cause the benefits to be gained from the allowances were not large
enough to overcome the subjective or objective costs of reorganizing
investment plans.
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to investment decisions," Williams gives separate consideration to
their liquidity and their profitability aspects. On the alleged inade-
quacy of depreciation allowances as a source of replacement funds
in times of rising prices, he points out that, over the period 1950-56,
total tax allowances for depreciation exceeded estimated capital
consumption by about 10 per cent and that the proportion appears
to have risen in recent years. On the profitability aspects of the ini-
tial and the investment allowances, he notes that the latter discrim-
inate in favor of firms that turn their capital over fastest, while the
former discriminate in favor of rapidly growing firms. Consequent-
ly, in spite of the difficulties which a small minority of firms may
have in financing their capital requirements, Williams doubts
whether there is any justification for holding tax policy responsible
for this or whether resort to further adjustments in the tax laws
would be the best way of meeting this problem.
Alan Prest prefaced his comments on the Williams paper by ask-
ing whether any policies which the British government might have
adopted during the past ten or fifteen years could have made very
much difference in that country's rate of growth, given the con-
straints under which it had to operate. He thought that any conclu-
sions about the effects of tax policy on the British economic growth
during this period ought to be considered in this context. Prest also
thought that Williams might have given some attention in his
paper to the ways in which the British tax system has helped per-
sonal saving and to the ways in which it might conceivably have
contributed to strengthening the balance of payments.
Prest was inclined to support Williams' view that the effects of
the various capital allowances have been somewhat stronger than
might be gathered from the statements made by businessmen on
this subject. He noted that each jump in the concessions which the
government has made here has been followed by large increases in
capital expenditures, and he called attention to the fact that recent
changes in the statutes on these allowances had made them ex-
tremely liberal. Indeed, he was inclined to doubt whether the re-
placement of Great Britain's profits tax by a value-added tax—as has
been proposed—from which purchases of capital goods would be ex-
empt w.ould provide very much additional incentive to invest.Introduction and Summary 35
SOME CONCLUSIONS
A conference on a subject as broad as tax policy and economic
growth, which involved participants from a number of different
countries and from a variety of professional and business back-
grounds, could hardly be expected to arrive at any very firm conclu-
sions after two and a half days of discussion. But, despite the
differencesin points of view and value judgments that were
reflected in the conference papers and discussions, there did appear
to be substantial agreement on a number of important points.
One point that was emphasized repeatedly was the difficulty of
trying to relate differences in the growth rates of various countries
to differences in specific tax policies. Even though a good deal is
now known about the process of growth and about the determi-
nants of growth, it is far from easy to assign a specific weight to the
contribution of any one factor in a particular country during a par-
ticular period of time. Few persons would deny that tax policies
have had some influence on the postwar growth rates of all of the
countries whose records were examined; but even in those countries
where the influence of tax policies was believed to be greatest, there
were other important contributing factors.
For example, a strong investment demand was clearly a powerful
spur to growth in such countries as Japan, Germany, and Italy
where, after a period of reconstruction, industry had strong incen-
tives to exploit expanding markets at home and abroad. Further-
more, in all three of these countries, a large reserve of underem-
ployed or immigrant workers could be tapped for the support of an
expanding industrial sector. Expanding export markets were impor-
tant elements in the growth of the Netherlands, France, and Ger-
many; and Japan was particularly favored by a low capital-output
ratio.
While it was recognized that tax policies can influence growth in
a number of ways, it was generally assumed that the fiscal experi-
ments in which the Conference would have the most interest were
those which sought to promote growth by spurring capital forma-
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which might have been expected to increase aggregate savings and
investment in relation to gross national product. It was, of course,
appreciated that one very effective way of increasing the savings
ratio was to pursue a budget policy which provided for the financ-
ing of the government's own capital outlays, and in some cases also
its loans to private enterprise, out of tax receipts. In both Sweden
and the Netherlands, budget policies were formulated with a view
to satisfying savings needs, while in France and Germany govern-
ment loans to private industry in key areas were held by some to
have played as important a rOle in promoting growth as the special
tax measures that were adopted in those countries.
An adequate supply of savings appear not to have been a prob-
lem in Great Britain; nor was it in Italy until that country tried to
tax the dividend income of its nationals. Japan's growth was also
supported by a high savings ratio and by the ability of large busi-
ness enterprises to draw on the resources of the Bank of Japan
through the commercial banks. So it was not only through special
tax policies that the governments of these countries contributed to
the maintenance of high investment ratios.
Although all seven of the countries represented at the Conference
experimented with various types of schemes to encourage personal
savings among lower income bracket individuals, it was generally
agreed that these schemes were very costly and were not as a rule
very effective. The most that could be said for them was that they
may have changed the form which personal savings took among
these groups and that they served to counterbalance to some extent
the tax advantages which liberal capital allowances and investment
credits conferred on the entrepreneurial groups in these countries.
On the special tax measures intended to encourage business sav-
ing and investment, the majority view was that they had been effec-
tive not only in directing investment into certain favored sectors of
industry but also in raising the general level of investment. When
the representatives of each of the participating countries were asked
whether, in their opinion, more general tax cuts would not have
contributed as much to the growth of their country as the more se-
lective and discriminatory measures that were adopted, the answer
with one exception was in the negative. They clearly thought thatIntroduction and Summary 37
the so-called "carrot and stick" approach was justified by the cir-
cumstances prevailing in their countries during the period in ques-
tion. Although it was recognized that, with perfect markets, a gen-
eral tax cut could contribute as effectively, and perhaps even more
effectively, to growth, it was felt that such a situation did not exist
and that the firms which benefited most from the selective Cuts
would tend to be those with the highest propensity to invest. On
the other hand, few were inclined to dispute the contention that
the selective approach might be carried too far, as it perhaps was in
Japan. In any case, it was agreed that the price a country might
have to pay for growth promoted in this way could be very high,
mainly from the standpoint of equity but also from that of an opti-
mal allocation of resources.
One point which became more and more evident as the Confer-
ence progressed was that much too little is known about the actual
effects of specific tax measures on the savings and investment deci-
sion.s of individuals and corporations. Neither those who expressed
confidence in the efficacy of particular measures nor those who were
skeptical about the significance of any particular tax structure or
measure for economic growth were able to offer much empirical
support for their positions. Consequently, it would have been
difficultto escape the conclusion that many more quantitative
stud.ies need to be undertaken in this area if the future tax policies
of the advanced industrial nations are to be based on sound cvi-
dence of their consequences for growth.